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BASHOR/NUNN AGREEMENTS: CAN AN INSURER 
INTERVENE IN A LAWSUIT BETWEEN A PLAINTIFF AND 
INSURED DEFENDANT UNDER COLORADO LAW? 
NATHAN A. SCHACHT† 
Snaking through the courts of many jurisdictions are important un-
der-the-radar lawsuits, the outcomes of which are critically important to 
insurers. Imagine this: you are an insurer and one of your insured is in-
volved in an accident in which a third-party is injured. The third-party 
sues the insured for injuries resulting from the accident. However, you, 
the insurer, are not a party to the lawsuit. During pre-trial settlement ne-
gotiations, the third-party and the insured enter into a private agreement 
that you are excluded from. The agreement assigns all of the insured’s 
rights and interest in any claim for insurance the insured may have 
against the insurer to the third-party. In exchange for this, the third-party 
agrees to not execute or attempt to enforce any judgment against the in-
sured.  Moreover, the third-party and insured agree to a quick liability 
and damage determination, if it is not stipulated to in the agreement, be-
fore a court or arbitrator. The third-party and insured carry out this de-
termination without your involvement.  The third-party then pursues its 
claim against you in a separate bad faith lawsuit.  You had no participa-
tion in the underlying lawsuit, but are nevertheless thus stuck fighting 
against the stigma of the liability and/or damages determination from the 
previous suit in the subsequent bad faith action.   
Needless to say, this is not a position in which insurers like to find 
themselves, but this is happening across multiple jurisdictions, including 
the State of Colorado. This article explores the legal background of these 
agreements and argues that, though this is an issue of first impression in 
Colorado, insurers likely meet all Rule 24 intervention requirements and 
should be allowed to intervene in underlying tort actions in order to pro-
mote public policy goals such as fairness and judicial economy. 
BASHOR/NUNN AGREEMENTS 
The Colorado Supreme Court first expressly permitted agreements 
between insureds and third-parties in the decision Northland Insurance 
Co. v. Bashor.1 In Bashor, a third-party sued an insured and obtained a 
judgment in excess of the insured’s liability policy limits.2 Subsequently, 
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 1. 494 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1972).  
 2. Id. at 1293. 
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the insured and third-party executed an agreement in which the insured 
agreed to: (1) pay a portion of the judgment; (2) pursue the remainder 
against the insurer through a bad faith claim for breach of the duty to 
settle; and (3) pay any judgment obtained in the bad faith litigation to the 
third-party.3 In exchange, the third-party agreed to not collect on the 
judgment against the insured.4 After the insurer challenged the insured 
and third-party’s agreement, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
agreement was valid.5 Thus, the Bashor decision permits an insured and 
third-party to enter into a post-trial agreement involving a covenant not 
to execute on a judgment that has been determined by a neutral fact-
finder. 
The Colorado Supreme Court reinforced this ruling by finding a 
similar type of agreement valid in Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Ross.6 
In Old Republic, the insureds and third-parties entered into an agreement 
related to a lawsuit for injuries resulting from an airplane accident.7 In 
the agreement, the insureds consented to a stipulated judgment against 
them for over $5 million and the third-parties agreed to not collect on 
that stipulated judgment.8 In return, the insureds agreed to pursue bad 
faith claims against their insurer so as to satisfy the stipulated judgment.9 
In response, the insurer challenged the stipulated judgment claiming that 
it was not enforceable.10 The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the 
stipulated judgment was not binding on the insurer in the subsequent bad 
faith litigation unless bad faith was found, in which case the stipulated 
judgment could be enforceable.11 Although the Supreme Court empha-
sized that the insurer must be found liable for bad faith in order for the 
stipulated judgment to be enforceable, the Court expressly declined to 
hold that all pretrial stipulated judgments are per se unenforceable,12 
leaving insurers financially exposed to pre-trial agreements in which they 
were not included.  
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court further clarified the scope and 
enforceability of these agreements and stipulated judgments in Nunn v. 
Mid-Century Insurance Co.13 In Nunn, a third-party sued the insured for 
personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident.14 Before trial, the 
insured and third-party entered into a settlement agreement in which the 
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 6. 180 P.3d 427 (Colo. 2008).   
 7. Id. at 429. 
 8. Id. 
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 10. Id. at 431. 
 11. Id. at 433–34.   
 12. Id. 
 13. 244 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2010). 
 14. Id. at 118.   
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insured agreed to pay $100,000, his insurance policy limit, to the third-
party and also stipulated to an additional judgment totaling $4,000,000.15 
The insured further agreed to assign his bad faith claims against the in-
surer to the third-party.16 The third-party agreed not to execute on the 
stipulated judgment.17 Subsequently, the third-party brought a bad faith 
action against the insurer for failure to accept a reasonable settlement 
offer.18 The insurer successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that the third-party did not have actual damages despite the stipulated 
judgment and the covenant not to execute.19 On appeal, the Colorado 
Supreme Court reversed the two lower courts and concluded that the 
stipulated judgment could in fact serve as proof of actual damages.20 The 
Court explained that the stipulated judgment was not automatically bind-
ing on the insurer and that it would have an opportunity to defend the 
reasonableness of its settlement decisions in the subsequent bad faith 
action.21 Consequently, in the bad faith action, the third-party was re-
quired to prove not only that the insurer acted in bad faith, but also that 
the stipulated judgment was “a reasonable reflection of the worth of [the 
third-party’s] injury claims against [the insured], and thus the proper 
measure of damages for [the third-party’s] bad faith claim against [the 
insurer].”22 “As such, the particular amount of the stipulated judgment 
merely serves as evidence of the value of Nunn’s claims as bargained for 
and does not represent the presumptive value of the actual damages in 
the bad faith case.”23  
These cases illustrate the Colorado Supreme Court’s affirmation of 
the validity of these types of agreements between insureds and third-
parties, to the detriment of insurers.  These agreements, which can result 
in stipulated judgments without any neutral fact-finder adjudicating the 
claims or judgment amount, can serve as evidence in subsequent bad 
faith proceedings against the insurer.  With juries already predisposed to 
a general distrust of insurance companies, these stipulated judgments 
potentially have a significant prejudicial effect on insurers in bad faith 
litigation, litigation in which insurers are already accused of acting un-
reasonably.  So, how does an insurer attempt to protect itself in these 
situations?  Currently, the most feasible way for an insurer to protect 
itself in these situations is by intervening in the underlying tort action 
between the insured and the third-party. 
  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.   
 19. Id. at 118–19.   
 20. Id. at 122–23. 
 21. Id. at 123.   
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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RULE 24 AND THE ABILITY TO INTERVENE 
A party may intervene as a matter of right if: (1) the applicant 
claims an interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the disposi-
tion of the case may impede or impair the applicant’s ability to protect 
that interest; and (3) the interest is not adequately represented by existing 
parties.24  
The first prong of this test “is primarily a practical guide to dispos-
ing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is 
compatible with efficiency and due process.”25 The second “impairment” 
prong questions whether there is a clear alternative venue in which the 
proposed intervener may pursue relief.26 Once an intervener can point to 
an “interest relating to the transaction” that is the basis of the ongoing 
lawsuit, the intervening party should be allowed to participate if it ap-
pears that all of its interests may not otherwise be adequately represented 
by those already parties to that lawsuit.27   
Although no published decision from a Colorado court has opined 
on an insurer’s ability to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 in this context, 
other states have allowed such intervention.  This article argues that the 
circumstances underlying Bashor/Nunn agreements as well as the inter-
ests of, and potential prejudice to, an insurer in such context leans in 
favor of permitting intervention. 
CASE LAW CONCERNING AN INSURER’S ABILITY TO INTERVENE IN THE 
BASHOR/NUNN CONTEXT 
In states that have recognized agreements like Colorado’s Ba-
shor/Nunn agreements, insurers are permitted to intervene in an underly-
ing tort suit where the damages component of the insurer’s potential lia-
bility for later bad faith claims is being litigated.28   
The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in H.B.H. v. State Farm Fire 
and Casualty Company is instructive and persuasive on an insurer’s abil-
ity to intervene.29  In H.B.H., the third-party and insured entered into a 
  
 24. COLO. R. CIV. P. 24(a); Feigin v. Alexa Grp., Ltd., 19 P.3d 23, 26 (Colo. 2001).  
 25. Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist., 266 P.3d 401, 404 (Colo. 2011) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
 26. See Mauro by & through Mauro v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 12CA1509, 2013 
WL 3943247, at *3 (Colo. App. Aug. 1, 2013). 
 27. See, e.g., O'Hara Grp. Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Hous. Sys., Inc., 595 P.2d 679, 688 (Colo. 
1979) (en banc). 
 28. See, e.g., Himes v. Safeway Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 74, 78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (insurer permit-
ted to intervene of right prior to entry of stipulated judgment); Purvis v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 
877 P.2d 827, 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (insurer properly intervened of right where insured did not 
tender defense to insurer and insurer became aware of suit after insured was already represented by 
counsel); Anderson v. Martinez, 762 P.2d 645, 648 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (insurer permitted to 
intervene of right because it would generally be bound in a later suit by injured party by collateral 
estoppel effect of determination of insured’s liability and plaintiff’s damages in underlying case). 
 29. 823 P.2d 1332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
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“Damron” agreement, which is comparable to a Bashor/Nunn Agree-
ment.30 In the agreement, the third-party agreed to limit the insured’s 
personal liability and collect the remainder of any judgment in the under-
lying litigation from the insurer.31 Prior to a hearing on damages, the 
insurer moved to intervene pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a), which was denied.32 In holding that the insurer had a right to inter-
vene pursuant to Rule 24(a) for the purpose of contesting the reasonable-
ness of any damages award, the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed multi-
ple Arizona decisions allowing insurers to intervene including Anderson 
v. Martinez.33 The court concluded that because a hearing on damages 
would be completely one-sided in favor of the plaintiff due to the Dam-
ron agreement, and because the insurer had a right to question the rea-
sonableness of the agreement, the most appropriate time for the insurer to 
intervene was during the underlying litigation.34  
Though intervention in this context is still a matter of first impres-
sion in Colorado, it is likely that insurers would be able to successfully 
intervene in an insured and third party’s tort lawsuit in order to properly 
protect their interests.  To start, an insurer can argue that it should be 
permitted to intervene as a matter of right because it has a real and direct 
interest in the subject matter of the underlying case because the amount 
of judgment issued in that case can be used as evidence against it in a 
subsequent bad faith action. Further, by entering into the Bashor/Nunn 
Agreement, the insured defendant abrogates any real interest in defend-
ing against liability and damage claims. Thus, as a practical matter, an 
insurer is not be protected by either party in the underlying tort litigation.   
These concerns are particularly important where the parties simply stipu-
late to a judgment or agree to submit the underlying tort claim to an al-
ternative dispute resolution process, such as arbitration or mediation.  By 
making these arguments in favor of intervention in combination with the 
supporting case law, insurers have a legitimate chance of being allowed 
to intervene so they may protect their interests in underlying tort litiga-
tion. 
In addition, Colorado public policy concerning judicial economy 
and settlement favors intervention.  Courts that have recognized the right 
of intervention by insurers in similar circumstances (i.e., involving Ba-
shor/Nunn-like agreements) did so, in part, because intervention pro-
motes judicial economy.35  Allowing an insurer to intervene so that the 
  
 30. Id. at 1333.   
 31. Id. at 1333–34. 
 32. Id. at 1334.   
 33. Anderson v. Martinez, 762 P.2d 645, 650 (Ariz. 1988). 
 34. H.B.H., 823 P.2d at 1338–39. 
 35. See Anderson, 762 P.2d at 650 (allowing an insurer to intervene and holding that, because 
an insurance company must be given an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a Bashor/Nunn-
type settlement between a plaintiff and insured, including whether or not it was fraudulent or collu-
sive, “it would serve the purpose of judicial economy to permit the insurer to take this opportunity 
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issue of a judgment’s reasonableness is dealt with in a single proceeding 
promotes judicial economy and similarly increases the likelihood that the 
parties will, once intervention is allowed, attempt a global settlement of 
the dispute.  This saves judicial resources, time, and money for all parties 
involved. 
CONCLUSION 
The Colorado Supreme Court has affirmed the validity of Ba-
shor/Nunn agreements between insureds and third-parties, allowing the 
insured to trade his own liability in exchange for his rights to sue an in-
surer. This leaves the insurer, which had no participation in the underly-
ing lawsuit, stuck fighting against the stigma of the liability and/or dam-
ages determination from the previous suit in any subsequent bad faith 
action. In states, such as Arizona, that have recognized agreements like 
Colorado’s Bashor/Nunn agreements, insurers are regularly permitted to 
intervene in an underlying tort suit where the damages component of the 
insurer’s potential liability for later bad faith claims is being litigated.   
Colorado law permitting an insurer’s intervention in underlying tort 
litigation between a third-party and an insured is still unsettled and 
evolving. Though intervention in this context is still a matter of first im-
pression in Colorado, it is likely that insurers meet all Rule 24 interven-
tion requirements and can successfully argue to be allowed to intervene 
in underlying tort actions in order to promote public policy goals such as 
fairness and judicial economy. 
 
  
when all of the parties are involved and can present evidence to the court on the issue at one hear-
ing”); H.B.H., 823 P.2d at 1337–38 (citing Anderson, 762 P.2d at 650) (finding error where trial 
court failed to allow insurer to intervene). 
